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European Lessons in Higher Education
Dawn D. Schillerl
Every state in the United States requires nonresidents to pay
more tuition than residents to attend state-supported colleges and
universities.' Traditionally, United States courts have upheld such
practices, ruling that states may constitutionally charge nonresi-
dents more than residents in order to equitably apportion public
education costs between the two. Because resident students (or
their parents) have already helped underwrite public university ex-
penses by paying taxes, their states require them to pay less tui-
tion to attend such universities.' Courts have upheld such practices
despite their potential infringement of two important constitu-
tional guarantees: the right to interstate travel and the Article IV
Privileges and Immunities Clause.
The European Court of Justice ("ECJ"), however, has forbid-
den European Community ("EC") Member States from charging
noncitizens more to attend state-supported institutions, ruling that
such practices violate Article 7 of the Treaty of Rome ("EEC
Treaty" or "Treaty"), which prohibits Member States from dis-
criminating against nationals from other Member States. The
ECJ's opinions in this area reaffirm the European Community's
commitment to rights such as equal opportunity and nondiscrimi-
nation-rights to which the United States is also committed.
Part I of this Comment discusses United States judicial scru-
tiny of resident/non-resident tuition differentiation. More particu-
larly, it argues that charging non-residents higher tuition fees un-
constitutionally interferes with their right to travel and violates
the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Part II discusses EC law re-
garding tuition differentiation, assessing the ECJ's conclusion that
differentiated tuition charges constitute impermissible discrimina-
t B.A. 1988, University of North Carolina; J.D. Candidate 1993, University of Chicago.
Note, The Constitutionality of Nonresident Tuition, 55 Minn L Rev 1139, 1139
(1971). A few limited reciprocity agreements exist between universities in neighboring
states. For a description of some of these, see Expanding Undergraduate Opportunities
through Reciprocity: A Western Focus (Western Interstate Commission for Higher Educa-
tion, 1987).
' See, for example, Kirk v Board of Regents of the Univ. of California, 273 Cal App 2d
430, 444, 78 Cal Rptr 260 (1969).
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tion. Part III concludes and suggests that the United States should
follow the EC's example and eliminate tuition differentiation. This
would both better protect constitutional values and improve the
effectiveness and efficiency of the public university system.
I. UNITED STATES LAW
A. The Fundamental Right to Travel
Although the Articles of Confederation provided that "the
people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from
any other State,"3 the Constitution does not explicitly guarantee
such a right. This omission can be justified on the ground that the
right to interstate travel was so fundamental to the success of the
new Union that the Founders simply understood it to be implicitly
protected by the new Constitution.4 Whatever the explanation, de-
spite "recurring differences in emphasis within the Court as to the
source of the constitutional right of interstate travel," its constitu-
tional status has never been questioned.5
Courts have grounded the right to interstate travel6 in no
fewer than three constitutional provisions: the Commerce Clause,7
the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause,8
and the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause.9 The right
extends to all United States citizens: It is an "unconditional per-
sonal right," the exercise of which may not be restricted.10 The
' Articles of Confederation, Art IV.
' See United States v Guest, 383 US 745 (1966).
Guest, 383 US at 759. See also Attorney Gen. of New York v Soto-Lopez, 476 US 898,
901 (1986) ("[F]reedom to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as
a basic right under the Constitution.").
' For an explanation of the right to travel, see Soto-Lopez, 476 US at 901-02; Shapiro v
Thompson, 394 US 618, 630 n 8 (1969).
Guest, 383 US at 758-59 ("[Tlhe federal commerce power surely encompasses the
movement in interstate commerce of persons as well as commodities."). See also Gloucester
Ferry Co. v Pennsylvania, 114 US 196, 203 (1885); Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v
Kentucky, 154 US 204, 218-19 (1894); Hoke v United States, 227 US 308, 320 (1913);
United States v Hill, 248 US 420, 423 (1919).
' US Const, Amend XIV, § 1 ("No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."). For a discussion of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause as applied to the right to travel, see Edwards v Cali-
fornia, 314 US 160, 181, 183-85 (1941) (Douglas and Jackson concurring); Twining v New
Jersey, 211 US 78, 97 (1908).
' US Const, Art IV, § 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."). See Corfield v Coryell, 6 F Cases 546,
552 (No 3230 CC E D Pa 1825); Paul v Virginia, 75 US (8 Wall) 168, 180 (1869); Ward v
Maryland, 79 US (12 Wall) 418, 430 (1871).
"G Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330, 341 (1972).
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right includes the "freedom to enter and abide in any State in the
Union."11 Thus, a "state law implicates the right to travel when it
actually deters such travel, . . . or when it uses any classification
which serves to penalize the exercise of that right. '12
1. Compelling interest or rational basis scrutiny?
State residency requirements that affect the ability of a partic-
ular class of individuals to travel to, or take up abode in, the state
have been scrutinized under two different tests. One line of cases,
represented by Shapiro v Thompson,1" has held that in general,
"any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of [the]
right [to travel], unless shown to be necessary to promote a com-
pelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional."" However, a
second line of cases, directly addressing the specific practice of tui-
tion differentiation and represented by Bryan v Regents of Univer-
sity of California,5 has held that a state need only show a rational
basis for tuition differentiation in order to constitutionally justify
the incidental burden these practices place on the right to travel.
Because the Supreme Court has never considered the issue di-
rectly, the question of the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to
tuition differentiation practices remains an open one. Although the
only cases to directly consider tuition differentiation-i.e., Bryan
and its progeny-have assessed such practices under a rational ba-
sis test, both the Supreme Court's holding in Shapiro and the pol-
icy underlying the right to travel suggest that the compelling inter-
est test is the more appropriate standard of review in this context.
In Shapiro v Thompson, the Supreme Court struck down a
one-year residency requirement that Pennsylvania used to deter-
mine eligibility for state welfare benefits."6 The opinion establishes
a simple test: if a state's residency requirement penalizes the exer-
cise of the right to travel, to survive constitutional scrutiny, the
" Oregon v Mitchell, 400 US 112, 285 (1970), (Stewart concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
12 Attorney General of New York v Soto-Lopez, 476 US 898, 903 (1986) (citation omit-
ted). See also, Memorial Hospital v Maricopa County, 415 US 250, 258 (1974) (penalties on
the right to travel interstate must satisfy a compelling state interest and "any durational
residence requirement imposes a potential cost on migration"). For further elaboration of
the standard applied to penalties, see text at notes 21-26.
"3 394 US 618 (1969).
1 394 US at 634 (first emphasis added, second emphasis original). However, the court
limited its holding to the welfare context, noting that its opinion did not reach tuition dif-
ferentiation practices. Id at 638 n 21.
188 Cal 559, 205 P 1071 (1922).
10 394 US at 618.
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state must demonstrate that its requirement promotes a compel-
ling governmental interest. For the test to apply, a plaintiff need
not show that a particular requirement actually deterred her from
traveling; the mere tendency for a requirement to penalize migra-
tion or interstate travel will suffice.1 7
Bryan v Regents of University of California was the first case
to test the constitutionality of residency requirements in the tui-
tion fee context.' 8 Although decided by the California Supreme
Court over 45 years before the United States Supreme Court de-
cided Shapiro, Bryan's analysis typifies the approach federal
courts have subsequently used in assessing the constitutionality of
differentiated tuition charges. Thus, in Starns v Malkerson,9 a
federal district court held that the University of Minnesota's domi-
cile requirement did not deter interstate travel.20 The court distin-
guished the Minnesota domicile requirement from the residency
requirement at issue in Shapiro. First, the court noted that Minne-
sota's domicile requirement was not intended to deter out-of-state
students from taking up residence in the state, and, indeed, it did
not actually deter them as evidenced by the over 6,000 nonresi-
dents that attended the school. Second, the court held that be-
cause higher education was not one of the "basic necessities of
life," the Minnesota domicile requirement did not have the same
deterrent effect on interstate migration as the welfare eligibility re-
quirement at issue in Shapiro.2 1
" Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330, 339-40 (1972) ("Shapiro did not rest upon a finding
that denial of welfare actually deterred travel. Nor have other 'right to travel' cases in this
Court always relied on the presence of actual deterrence."). See also, King v New Rochelle
Municipal Housing Authority, 314 F Supp 427, 430 (S D NY 1970), aff'd 442 F2d 646 (2nd
Cir 1971) ("Shapiro does not indicate that actual deterrence need be shown").
" 188 Cal at 559. In Bryan, a minor, denied residency status because her parents had
not lived in California for the statutorily-mandated one-year period, sought a writ compel-
ling the university to admit her as a resident.
19 326 F Supp 234 (D Minn 1970).
20 Id.
21 Id at 237-38. In its decision, the Starns court relied on the California Supreme
Court's decision in Kirk v Board of Regents of the University of California, which applied
the rational basis test for the same reasons: See id at 240-41, citing Kirk, 273 Cal App 2d
430.
In Kirk, the California Supreme Court reasoned that whereas the residency require-
ment in Shapiro denied petitioners essential sustenance for the preservation of life and
health, differentiated tuition requirements presented problems of a less fundamental nature.
Kirk, 273 Cal App 2d at 440. Thus, the Kirk court concluded that "[ciharging higher tuition
fees to nonresident students cannot be equated with granting of basic subsistence to one
class of needy residents while denying it to an equally needy class of residents." Id. In addi-
tion, unlike the requirement in Shapiro, the residency requirement contested in Kirk did
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Bryan and Starns, by resting their holdings on the "nonessen-
tial" nature of education and the consequential lack of deterrence
due to higher tuition rates, are, at a minimum, statistically un-
sound.22 More importantly, these decisions misconstrue the thresh-
old requirement established by Shapiro for imposing the compel-
ling state interest test. Under Shapiro, merely potentially
penalizing the right to travel warrants the application of the com-
pelling interest test; a state's apparently nondiscriminatory intent
in enacting a statute cannot qualify the statute for scrutiny under
the less exacting, rational basis test.23
Tuition differentiation practices easily satisfy the threshold
showing needed to trigger application of the Shapiro test. Not only
do such practices potentially penalize students' exercise of their
right to travel, but they also actually deter many students from
studying at out-of-state institutions. The reasons for this are not
difficult to ascertain.
To qualify for in-state tuition, most universities require stu-
dents to either be "residents" of, or "legally domiciled" in, the
state in which the university is located.2 ' To establish legal resi-
dency or domicile, the student must usually reside in the state for
a period of six to twelve months prior to enrolling at a public col-
lege or university.25 Thus, a nonresident student who wants to
avoid paying out-of-state tuition-which, in some instances, is as
not preclude students from the benefit of obtaining higher education-they simply had to
pay more for the privilege. Id.
32 See text at notes 26-28.
23 Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618, 638 (1969). While this test may become implausi-
ble if extended to extreme cases, Shapiro stands for the proposition that the constitutional
right to travel prevents more than just physical impairment of movement. Exactly where the
line should be drawn between permissible and impermissible regulation remains unclear.
However, this Comment argues that tuition differentiation should qualify as the type of
interference Shapiro forbids.
24 Note, Tuition Residence Requirements: A Second Look in Light of Zobel and Marti-
nez, 61 Ind L J 287, 289 (1986). For tuition purposes, "resident" and "legal domicile" are
generally synonymous. See Note, Residence Requirements for Tuition: An Unsolved Di-
lemma, 6 Ind L Rev 283, 284 n 8 (1972). However, the legal tests for the two are different:
"[d]omicile requires physical presence at a place with the intent of making that place a
home," while the residency test is less exacting. Id, citing Restatement Second of Conflicts
of Laws § 11 (1971), and J.D. McClean, The Meaning of Residence, 11 Intl & Comp L Q
1153, 1155 (1962) ("Any period of physical presence, however short, may constitute resi-
dence if it is shown that the presence is not transitory."). A student's knowledge that he
may leave a state after graduating from its university does not preclude him from establish-
ing temporary domicile for the purposes of voting registration. See Shivelhood v Davis, 336
F Supp 1111, 1114-15 (D Vt 1971); Newburger v Peterson, 344 F Supp 559 (D NH 1972).
15 Note, 61 Ind L J at 289 (cited in note 24). In addition, many states exacerbate this
problem by refusing to count towards the specified waiting period the time spent in the
state while attending the university. Id.
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much as seven hundred percent higher than in-state tui-
tion 26 -must often discontinue her education for a significant
length of time and support herself away from home. In so doing,
she necessarily postpones career training and academic develop-
ment. For a bright, ambitious student of modest means, such a
penalty has often proven sufficient to convince her to attend an in-
state college.2 Out-of-state education, even if better suited to her
needs, is often simply too expensive.18 Therefore, courts, in review-
ing tuition differentiation practices, should hold states to a com-
pelling interest standard.
2. Tuition differentiation does not survive compelling inter-
est scrutiny.
Although Shapiro does not exhaustively list those justifica-
tions that may qualify as compelling state interests, it suggests
that fiscal justifications will rarely rise to such a level.29 Thus, in
Zobel v Williams, 0 the Supreme Court struck down an Alaskan
policy that distributed surplus state oil revenues to residents in
proportion to the length of their residency in the state. Citing lan-
guage from Shapiro, the Court held that Alaska's asserted interest
26 Expanding Undergraduate Opportunities at 29 (cited in note 1) ("Average tuition
and fee charges for nonresident students vary from 2.1 times greater than resident student
charges to a high of seven times greater, with a simple average of 3.3 times greater"). See
also, Report of the Advisory Committee on Nonresident Tuition Policies under S Con Res
69, Rep No 89-20, State Policy Guidelines for Adjusting Nonresident Tuition at Califor-
nia's Public Colleges and Universities 8 (Cal State Post Secondary Ed Comm'n, 1989)
("These data indicate that today's nonresident students are paying more than four times
the amount paid by their resident student counterparts").
27 The empirical data collected concerning the effects of differentiated tuition costs on
enrollment levels indicate that charging nonresidents higher tuition fees often deters them
from attending out-of state colleges and universities. Indeed, "studies using data from be-
tween 1968 and 1972 indicate that enrollments would increase by between 0.04 and 1.25
percent for every $100 reduction in tuition charges." Mary Jo Bane and Kenneth I. Win-
ston, Equality in Higher Education 70 (Harvard Univ Graduate School of Education, 1980).
See also, Steve Hunka, Rationales for Determining Student Contributions to Costs of Post-
Secondary Education and Information Report 18-25 (Alberta Univ, Edmonton Div'n of
Educational Research, 1979); James N. Morgan, Tuition Policy and the Interstate Migra-
tion of College Students, 19 Research in Higher Ed 183 (1983).
28 See Comment, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-State University's One- Year
Waiting Requirement to Attain Resident Status for Tuition Payment Does Not Violate
Fourteenth Amendment, 24 Ala L Rev 147, 154 (1971) ("To state flatly that higher tuition
charges for nonresidents do not deter out-of-state students strains credibility; for a certain
class of students-those who can only marginally afford the resident rate of tuition-the
additional charge would be prohibitive.").
29 Shapiro, 394 US at 638.
30 457 US 55 (1982).
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in rewarding its citizens for past tax contributions did not qualify
as a compelling governmental interest:
[Sustaining the challenged classification] as an attempt
to distinguish between new and old residents on the basis
of the contributions they have made to the community
through payment of taxes . . . would . . . permit the
State to apportion all benefits and services according to
the past tax [or intangible] contributions of its citizens.
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits such an appor-
tionment of state services.31
Thus, Shapiro and its progeny suggest that in most instances, a
state's fiscal interest in rewarding past tax contributions cannot
qualify as a compelling governmental interest.32
Nonetheless, under rational basis scrutiny, the only justifica-
tion most states have offered for their practice of charging out-of-
state students higher tuition is that it is a means of equalizing
costs between in- and out-of-state students:
[I]t appears to be a reasonable attempt to achieve a par-
tial cost equalization by collecting lower tuition fees from
those persons who, directly or indirectly, have recently
made some contribution to the economy of the state
through having been employed, having paid taxes, or
having spent money in the state for the brief period of
Id at 63, quoting Shapiro, 394 US at 632-33 (1969) (emphasis added).
32 State residency requirements may also be designed to foster attachment to the state.
However,
[Ain undifferentiated goal of fostering "attachment" to the state is, no doubt, best
achieved by penalizing interstate migration and rewarding longtime residents. But
without a showing that fostering "attachment" furthers some other, independently
valid purpose, it surely cannot justify burdening the right to migrate, which neces-
sarily includes the right to change one's geographical attachments.
Comment, State Parochialism, the Right to Travel, and the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, 41 Stan L Rev 1557, 1579-80 (1989) (emphasis in original).
Arguments by the state that its duties extend only to its citizens and that cost equaliza-
tion is therefore permissible discrimination against persons who are not its citizens and do
not intend to become citizens, or that overcrowding of colleges and inability to provide qual-
ity education necessitate discrimination, might bring the state closer to showing a compel-
ling interest in distinguishing between residents and nonresidents. Whether these argu-
ments would qualify as a compelling justification for state abridgment of the right to travel
is unclear. The Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed the constitutionality of tuition
residency requirements, although it affirmed without opinion both Starns v Malkerson, 401
US 985 (1971), and Kirk v Board of Regents of the Univ. of California, 396 US 554 (1970).
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one year prior to their attendance at a publicly financed
institution of higher education.33
However, this is precisely the kind of state justification that Zobel
held did not qualify as a compelling state interest. The fact that
in-state students may have contributed in the past to the public
revenues through taxes, employment, or expenditure is simply ir-
relevant; the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits such allocation
schemes. Therefore, tuition differentiation practices unconstitu-
tionally burden the exercise of a student's right to travel.
B. The Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause
Residency-based tuition differentiation also violates the Arti-
cle IV Privileges and Immunities Clause.3' The Clause states that
"The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States." 5 The Supreme
Court authoritatively interpreted the Clause eight decades after
the Constitution was ratified, stating that:
[T]he clause plainly and unmistakably secures and pro-
tects the right of a citizen of one State to pass into any
31 Kirk v Board of Regents of the Univ. of California, 273 Cal App 2d 430, 444, 78 Cal
Rptr 260 (1969). See also, Starns v Malkerson, 326 F Supp 234, 240 (D Minn 1970).
", Despite the nearly identical "privileges and immunities" language in both Article IV
and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution (see notes 7 and 8), the Supreme Court
rendered the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a practical
nullity in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) 36 (1873), which limited Fourteenth
Amendment protection to those rights derived from national citizenship, such as the right to
travel. See id at 79; Twining v New Jersey, 211 US 78, 97 (1908).
However, the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause accomplishes more than its
Fourteenth Amendment counterpart; Article IV frustrates discrimination based on state cit-
izenship. United Building & Construction Trades Council v Camden, 465 US 208, 226
(1984) (Blackmun dissenting). Thus,
Its sole purpose was to declare to the several States, that whatever those rights, as
you grant or establish them to your own citizens, or as you limit or qualify, or
impose restrictions on their exercise, the same, neither more nor less, shall be the
measure of the rights of citizens of other States within your jurisdiction.
Slaughter House Cases, 83 US (16 Wall) at 77.
88 US Const, Art IV, § 2. However, in the Articles of Confederation, the Clause read as
follows:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the
people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these
States . . . shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the
several States; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to
and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and
commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabi-
tants thereof respectively.
Articles of Confederation, Art IV.
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other State of the Union for the purpose of engaging in
lawful commerce, trade, or business without
molestation .... 36
Thus, at a minimum, the Article IV Privileges and Immunities
Clause protects the rights of free trade and commerce. The
Clause also, arguably, guarantees certain fundamental, natural
rights.3 " Other commentators have argued that the Framers
drafted the Privileges and Immunities Clause to preserve peace
among the several states, and that this required a general rule of
nondiscrimination. 3 9
Whether it protects commercial rights, fundamental rights, or
some combination thereof, "like many other constitutional provi-
sions, the privileges and immunities clause is not an absolute." 0
However, it at least prohibits "discrimination against -citizens of
other States where there is no substantial reason for the discrimi-
nation beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other
States.""1 Thus, in Toomer v Witsell, the Supreme Court struck
down a South Carolina licensing law that required nonresidents to
pay significantly more than residents for a fishing license.2 The
Court held that the state failed to adduce a substantial reason to
justify its discriminatory licensing practice, because it could find
no "reasonable relationship between the alleged danger to the
'" Ward v Maryland, 79 US 418, 430 (1870). More recently, in 1984 the Court reiter-
ated, "Derived, like the Commerce Clause, from the fourth of the Articles of Confederation,
the Privileges and Immunities Clause was intended to create a national economic union."
Supreme Court of New Hampshire v Piper, 470 US 274, 279-80 (1985).
1 Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish State and the Market, 66 Tex L Rev 1097, 1119 (1988).
" Indeed,
The fourth Article of Confederation guaranteed "all privileges and immunities of
the free citizens in the several States," Articles of Confederation, Art. IV; the
Dickinson draft promised "the same Rights, Liberties, Privileges, Immunities and
Advantages in the other Colonies, which the said inhabitants now have," Articles
of Confederation, Art VI (Proposed Draft July 12, 1776); . . . and the Union with
Scotland Act protected "all other rights privileges and advantages which do or
may belong to the subjects of either kingdom," An Act for an Union of the Two
Kingdoms of England and Scotland (The Union with Scotland Act), 1706, 6 Anne,
ch 11.
Id at 1125-26 n 145.
" Gary J. Simson, Discrimination Against Nonresidents and the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause of Article IV, 128 U Pa L Rev 379, 383-86. (1979). For a complete discussion
of the history of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, see Gergen, The Selfish State, 66
Tex L Rev at 1116-32 (cited in note 37).
'0 Toomer v Witsell, 334 US 385, 396 (1948).
41 Id.
4" Id at 385.
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shrimp supply represented by non-citizens as a class, and the se-
vere discrimination practiced upon them. 43
Toomer v WitseU1, by analogy, also speaks to tuition differenti-
ation: "[A] state . . . must share its surplus educational facilities,
like its fish, with citizens of other states rather than deliberately
let them waste.""' Thus, Toomer and its progeny prohibit a state
from levying disproportionately high taxes upon nonresidents in
order to subsidize the benefits that it makes generally available to
both residents and nonresidents. 5
With respect to tuition differentiation, a state's taxpayers and
resident students would have to pay for all fixed costs of the state's
educational facilities if nonresidents were not admitted to the
state's schools.' 6 Consequently, if states admit nonresident stu,
dents and charge them the same tuition as residents, they will
thereby lower resident tuition or educational expenditures to some
extent. However, when a state seeks to cross-subsidize resident
educational costs by charging nonresident students more for tui-
tion-in some instances, as much as seven times more than its resi-
dents' 7-it necessarily discriminates against nonresident stu-
dents."8 A state cannot do this without violating the Article IV
Privileges and Immunities Clause: "A state is absolutely forbidden
from reducing tax burdens or other costs to its citizens by forcing
nonresidents to make good all of the reduction."'49
Perhaps, at some level, if a state could show that nonresident
students would displace resident students if it charged both the
same tuition, it could justify residency-based tuition charges. How-
ever, in most states, resident students attend out-of-state colleges
and nonresident students attend in-state colleges in roughly equal
numbers °.5  Thus, with a few exceptions, nonresident students do
not displace resident students, and the state can supply no sub-
stantial reason to justify its discrimination against nonresident stu-
dents as a class. Accordingly, under Toomer v Witsell, tuition dif-
"' Id at 386.
" Charles H. Clarke, Validity of Discriminatory Nonresident Tuition Charges in Pub-
lic Higher Education Under the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause, 50 Neb L
Rev 31, 34 (1971).
45 Id.
46 Id.
4 See note 26.
48 Clarke, 50 Neb L Rev at 34 (cited in note 44).
41 Id, citing Chalker v Birmingham & N.W. Ry., 249 US 522 (1919), and Ward v Mary-
land, 79 US (12 Wall) 418.
60 See Melodie E. Christal, Residence and Migration of College Students (Working Pa-
per Series, Nat'l Ctr for Higher Educ Mgmt Systems, 1982).
[1992:
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ferentiation violates the Article IV Privileges and Immunities
Clause and is therefore unconstitutional. 51
II. EC LAW
Article 7 of the EEC Treaty prohibits discrimination on the
basis of nationality:
Within the scope of application of this Treaty, and with-
out prejudice to any special provisions contained therein,
any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be
prohibited.52
Article 7 thus seeks to prevent Member States from enacting or
maintaining discriminatory legislation and/or administrative
practices.
Article 7's broad wording lends itself to a variety of interpreta-
tions. However, it is best understood as one step towards the Com-
munity's broader goal of integration:
to promote throughout the Community a harmonious de-
velopment of economic activities, a continuous and bal-
anced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated
raising of the standard of living and closer relations be-
tween the States belonging to it.54
Viewed as such, Article 7 arguably guarantees rights akin to those
guaranteed by the United States Constitution-namely, the Article
IV Privileges and Immunities Clause and the right to interstate
travel.
However, within the context of higher education, the ECJ has
held that Article 7 forbids Member States from charging residents
of other Member States additional tuition to attend state-sup-
61 The Supreme Court has followed and expanded the principles of Toomer in subse-
quent cases. See, for example, Hicklin v Orbeck, 437 US 518 (1978), striking down an Alas-
kan employment measure that gave preferential treatment to Alaskan residents. The Court
found that Alaska's unemployment was not attributable to the influx of non-residents and
therefore held that discrimination against nonresidents did not bear a substantial relation-
ship to the "evil" they were said to present. See also, Supreme Court of New Hampshire .v
Piper, 470 US 274 (1985), striking down a New Hampshire law requiring attorneys to pos-
sess state residence as a prerequisite to bar admittance. Again, the Court held that the
state's objectives did not justify its blanket discrimination against all nonresidents.
" Treaty Est the Eur Eco Comm, Art 7.
"2 Prohibition of Discrimination Based on Nationality, 1 Common Mkt Rptr (CCH)
192 (1988).
" EEC, Art 2.
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ported universities. In Forcheri v Belgian State,55 the ECJ first in-
terpreted Article 7 to mean that a Member State may not organize
educational courses and later charge citizens of other Member
States an additional fee to enroll in such courses. Such a require-
ment is invalid under Article 7 because it discriminates on the ba-
sis of nationality." However, the Court limited its holding to en-
rollment fees for vocational training.5 7
In Gravier v City of Liege,8 the ECJ broadened its Forcheri
holding. In Gravier, Belgium, like United States state universities,
argued that the additional fee represented an attempt to equitably
apportion the costs of public education between citizens and nonci-
tizens.59 The ECJ, however, rejected Belgium's argument and
deemed the additional fee violative of Article 7. Although the
Court again limited its holding to vocational training, it defined
the term more broadly to include:
[a]ny form of education which prepares for a qualifica-
tion for a particular profession, trade or employment or
which provides the necessary skills for such a profession,
trade or employment is vocational training, whatever the
age and the level of training of the pupils or students,
even if the training programme includes an element of
general education. 0
Subsequently, the ECJ has required undifferentiated fees for
most university studies,61 ruling that most studies will qualify as
vocational training for Article 7 purposes:
" Case 152/82, 1983 ECR 2323, 1984:1 CMLR 334.
1983 ECR at 2324.
57 Id. This qualification kept the issue within the ECJ's jurisdiction, which only extends
to matters requiring interpretation of the EEC Treaty:
The Council shall . . . lay down general principles for implementing a common
vocational training policy capable of contributing to the harmonious development
both of the national economies and of the common market.
EEC, Art 128. On this basis the court determined that it had jurisdiction over the case:
although educational and vocational training policy is not as such part of the areas
which the Treaty has allotted to the competence of the Community institutions,
the opportunity for such kinds of instruction falls within the scope of the treaty.
Forcheri, 1983 ECR at 2323.
8 Case 293/83, 1985 ECR 593, 1985:3 CMLR 1.
19 1985 ECR at 596.
0 Id.
"1 Thus, the Court held that studies in veterinary medicine fall within the meaning of




University studies constitute vocational training not only
where the final academic examination directly provides
the required qualification for a particular profession,
trade or employment, but also in so far as the studies in
question provide specific training and skills needed by
the student for the pursuit of. a profession, trade or em-
ployment, even if no legislative or administrative provi-
sion makes the acquisition of that knowledge a prerequi-
site for that purpose.2
Thus, ECJ decisions have uniformly invalidated Member State tui-
tion differentiation as contrary to Article 7 of the EEC Treaty.6 3
III. THE EUROPEAN LESSON
A. Protecting Access to Education
The EC's primary objective is to integrate twelve independent
political and economic systems." Community lawmakers and the
ECJ have realized that an educational policy that transcends state
boundaries is an effective way to promote such integration, elimi-
nate discrimination, and ensure that the Community's human re-
sources are used wisely. Thus, the EC has sought to promote the
exchange of university students and to enhance the intra-Commu-
nity mobility of university graduates. Towards these ends, the
Council has issued numerous directives concerning mutual recogni-
tion of diplomas, certificates, and other indicia of professional
qualification. 5 The Council has also adopted the European Com-
munity Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students
("ERASMUS"), 6 established a trans-European mobility scheme
for university students ("TEMPUS"),67 and drafted general princi-
ples for implementing a common training policy.6 8 In addition, nu-
62 Id.
" See also Case 39/86, Lair v Universitlit Hannover, 1988 ECR 3161, 1989:3 CMLR
545; Case 197/86, Brown v Secretary of State for Scotland, 1988 ECR 3205, 1988:3 CMLR
403; Case 242/87, Commission v Council, 1989 ECR 1425, 1991:1 CMLR 478.
64 EEC, Art 2.
0 See, generally, Council Dir 89/48, 1988 OJ L019:16 (on a general system for the rec-
ognition of higher-education diplomas awarded on completion of professional education of
at least three year's duration).
, Council Dec 87/327, 1987 OJ L166:20 (adopting the European Community action
scheme for the mobility of university students).
"7 Council Dec 90/923, 1990 OJ L131:21 (establishing a trans-European mobility scheme
for university studies).
"8 Council Dec 63/226, 1963 OJ Spec Ed 1338 (laying down general principles for imple-
menting a common training policy).
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merous conventions and resolutions have further encouraged inte-
gration of Member State education systems..6 Therefore, the ECJ's
interpretation of Article 7 reflects the broader view that Commu-
nity goals are best served through an education policy that elimi-
nates discrimination, regionalism, and parochialism and that pro-
motes the free exchange of trained students.
United States courts have also recognized that education plays
"a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society.97 0
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has refused to recognize a consti-
tutional right to education: "Education, of course, is not among the
rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution.
Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected. 7 1
However, to conclude that higher education therefore deserves no
judicial protection oversimplifies the issue:
Whether the interest involved be described as a right or a
privilege, the fact remains that [education] is an interest
of almost incalculable value . . . . Private interests are to
be evaluated under the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, not in terms of labels or fictions, but
in terms of their true significance and worth.72
American society is also founded on a belief in individual
choice. This libertarian ethos extends to the educational realm:
We are philosophically committed to the freedom of the
individual to select education that will bring that person
the greatest measure of personal satisfaction, both in per-
sonal career and in use of leisure time. However, to be
assured- of this freedom of choice, the individual must
09 See, for example, Council Res of 18 December 1979 on Linked Work and Training for
Young Persons, 1980 OJ C001:1; Convention Setting Up a European University Institute,
1976 OJ C038:1; Res of the Council and of the Ministers for Education Meeting Within the
Council of 12 July 1982 Concerning Measures to be Taken to Improve the Preparation of
Young People for Work and to Facilitate their Transition from Education to Working Life,
1982 OJ C193:1.
7 Plyler v Doe, 457 US 202, 221 (1982), citing, among other cases, Meyer v Nebraska,
262 US 390, 400 (1923) (The "American people have always regarded education and [the]
acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance"); Abington School Dist. v
Schempp, 374 US 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan concurring) (recognizing public schools as vital
to the preservation of a democratic system).
"' San Antonio School Dist v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 35 (1973).
7' Knight v State Bd. of Educ., 200 F Supp 174, 178 (M D Tenn 1961). The court
granted black students injunctive relief to enforce their rights to procedural due process
after they were suspended from a state-supported university for participating in "freedom
rides." The court found that they had been deprived of a valuable right to continue their
training at a university of their choice.
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have a genuine opportunity to carry out his career aspira-
tion-an opportunity for access to education."
Furthermore, when a state seeks to provide an opportunity, it
becomes a right that the state must make available to all citizens
on equal terms.74 Since each state provides some sort of higher ed-
ucation, the ability to obtain public higher education has taken on
the status of a right in many instances. Thus, for the student, this
state-provided opportunity has become "a.right unencumbered by
a host of regulations and conditions whereby he might lose that
opportunity for reasons which he does not regard as absolutely
essential."'75
Access to post-secondary education is not among the general
rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. Rather, the right to
higher education is defined by the specific educational needs of
students and society. The "right" to an education should therefore
be understood as access to an opportunity: "It is a right which be-
comes more specific in its nature as the student continues to
demonstrate that he or she can maintain that right by the ability
to learn."76 No state should arbitrarily deny access to such oppor-
tunity, nor be permitted to offer it in a discriminatory manner.
Unfortunately, not all U.S. students have equal access to pub-
lic higher education. They do not possess equal choices because
"[flees that restrict the full scope of available educational opportu-
nities deprive some students of development to the limits of their
capabilities,"77 while students who can afford out-of-state tuition
can acquire an education that is better suited to their interests and
qualifications, regardless of where it is located.
The current system of tuition differentiation has its greatest
adverse effect on the poor. Indeed, studies show that despite finan-
cial aid grants, college enrollment by those who are members of the
lowest socioeconomic level drops very rapidly as costs increase,
while at the highest level of socioeconomic status, enrollment de-
creases only slightly with increasing costs:78 "The discriminatory
" T. H. Bell, Increasing Access to Post Secondary Education-The Federal Role 2
(Paper Presented at the 35th Intl Conf on Educ of the Intl Bureau of Educ, Geneva, Swit-
zerland, 1975).
14 Brown v Board of Education, 347 US 483, 493 (1954).
" Roy Lucas, The Right to Higher Education, 41 J Higher Ed 55 (1970).
" Hunka, Rationales For Determining Student Contributions at 2 (cited in note 27).
7" Note, Public School Fees in Illinois: A Re-examination of Constitutional and Policy
Questions, 1984 U Ill L Rev 99, 120 (1984).
," Id. While an equalization of tuition fees for all students will likely lead to a slight
increase in overall tuition charges, this effect should not be decisive. The systematic un-
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[tuition] charge makes an interstate education impossible for the
student who barely can manage the resident rate of tuition. 7
9
The wealth of a student's parents should not determine a stu-
dent's ability to attend college in another state. John Stuart Mill
once explained, "[t]he chief duty of the university is to produce
good citizens. '"s However, the United States's system of tuition
differentiation hinders this goal: It disadvantages those students
who cannot afford to pay higher fees for out-of-state education.
This type of wealth differentiation instills values that are contrary
to basic democratic principles of equal opportunity and non-
discrimination:
The enduring lesson taught in public schools is that
wealth breeds favored status while disadvantage leads to
still greater handicaps. A public school system designed
as the "very foundation of good citizenship" is thereby
weakened at its base.8 1
In addition, the present American system perpetuates parochi-
alism and prejudice. Public universities can reduce ignorance and
eliminate barriers among antagonistic social groups by providing a
forum for interaction and cooperation in various settings. Nonresi-
dent students enhance the learning experience of resident students
by exposing them to a diversity of backgrounds, viewpoints, and
cultures.8 2 By imposing fees that discourage such interaction,
states detract from the education that they provide.
B. A United States "Academic Common Market"
Access to publicly-funded higher education deserves a high de-
gree of protection. The European Economic Community, because it
is just now unifying, is particularly concerned with removing com-
munication barriers and ensuring equality among its citizens. How-
ever, in pursuing values that also resonate loudly in the Constitu-
derfunding of public higher education and the inadequacy of current financial aid packages
does not provide an excuse for continued violations of constitutional rights and unequal
application of state conferred benefits.
Clarke, 50 Neb L Rev at 40 (cited in note 44).
80 Taken from John Stuart Mill's address to the students of St. Andrew's, in Ben C.
Fisher, Toward a Philosophy of Higher Education, 9 Private Higher Education: The Job
Ahead 5 (Am Ass'n of Presidents of Independent Colleges and Universities, 1981).
" Note, 1984 U Ill L Rev at 121 (cited in note 77) (citing Johnson v New York State
Educ. Dep't, 449 F 2d 871, 883 (2d Cir 1971) (Kaufmann dissenting); Brown v Board of
Education, 347 US 483, 493 (1954); Ambach v Norwick, 441 US 68, 76 (1979)).
82 Advisory Committee, State Policy Guidelines at 26 (cited in note 26).
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tion, the ECJ has eclipsed the United States Supreme Court. At
the least, such irony suggests that the Supreme Court should
reevaluate the effect and validity of tuition differentiation. By fol-
lowing the European example, it would both more faithfully pro-
tect the values embodied in the Constitution and more effectively
promote the interests of American society.
Such a shift would also be timely and beneficial. Since World
War II, the percentage of the United States population enrolled in
higher education programs has increased far more rapidly than the
rate of general population growth." The Carnegie Commission has
thus predicted that by the year 2000, the United States will have
moved from a system of mass higher education to one of universal
higher education. 4 United States institutions must also grapple
with expanding enrollments and increasing student heterogeneity.
Thus, the country desperately needs "a greater diversity of paths
to a college education and for a broader range of educational
services."88
The public should also assist in the selection and training of
those practitioners in each field who will be most useful to society
after graduation." Towards that end, "[t]he federal government
must shift its concern from encouraging growth to a new concern
for effectiveness throughout postsecondary education. '87 Such ef-
fectiveness necessitates pairing national educational opportunities
as closely as possible with the abilities and interests of individual
students. Professionals should hone their skills in the programs
best suited to their individual abilities and interests: average edu-
cation produces only average practitioners. Thus, the states must
make available "an educational opportunity appropriate for the
student, and this requires a diversity of institutions beyond that
available today."88
"s Robert M. Hendrickson and M. Edward Jones, Nonresident Tuition: Student Rights
v. State Fiscal Integrity, 2 J L and Ed 443, 456 (1973).
84 The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, New Students and New Places;
Policies for Growth and Development of American Higher Education 9 (McGraw Hill,
1971).
88 Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, The Second Newman Report: Na-
tional Policy and Higher Education. Report of a Special Task Force to the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare xx (Dept HEW, 1973) (concluding that a change in govern-
mental policy towards higher education is essential).
" Id at 17.
Id at xxii. Incidentally, making education more effective should also spur economic
growth by enlarging human capital supplies.
18 Id at 36.
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Nonetheless, few states can afford-and one suspects that it
would be grossly inefficient-to establish and maintain postsecon-
dary institutions of the highest quality in all disciplines. National
resource sharing is a viable alternative because it avoids unneces-
sary duplication of programs. If a state can avoid the need for a
high cost or unusual program because a neighboring state offers
the necessary facilities, the state could then reallocate such savings
to other instructional programs. These programs will then better
educate not only resident students, but also students migrating
from neighboring states." Thus, states can enhance overall quality
by sharing both experiences and actual resources or facilities.
Creating a national system of public universities would ad-
dress many of our national educational challenges. Such a system
would also better serve state educational objectives, including:
the provision of postsecondary education for all students
seeking it; diversity of programmatic and institutional
choices; the efficient use of tax money; academic excel-
lence appropriate to individual programs and institu-
tions; and responsiveness both to society's need for a
trained workforce and the need of the individual student
for self-development.90
Under a national system, each student could obtain the best
education for his specific needs without greatly increasing the pub-
lic costs of providing education. The state would remain secure in
the knowledge that its resources were being used to ensure the aca-
demic success of its own citizens. Expenditures from a state's trea-
sury not being recovered by higher tuition charges to nonresidents
would actually be recouped when its students qualify for tax-sup-
ported education in other states.9 "
The idea of an "Academic Common Market"92 of this kind is
not new. Several states have recognized the advantages of such in-
terstate cooperation. Indeed, some interstate alliances between
public universities already exist.9 3 Although most of these pro-
89 Because a large percentage of students after graduation remain in the state where
they attended college, states would disserve their own interests by relying on other states to
fund education. Thus, a perverse incentive structure that encourages states to decrease the
funding of their universities will not likely develop. Although other practical problems may
arise with the elimination of discriminatory tuition charges, a complete analysis of economic
harms and benefits is beyond the scope of this Comment.
'o Expanding Undergraduate Opportunities at 3 (cited in note 1).
11 Clarke, 50 Neb L Rev at 41 (cited in note 44).
9' Expanding Undergraduate Opportunities at 10 (cited in note 1).
" For a complete listing and description of these programs, see id.
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grams are experimental and limited to particular types of universi-
ties or specific geographic areas,94 a national system could surely
build upon such experiences.
CONCLUSION
The European Court of Justice has not compromised basic
Community values such as freedom of travel and nondiscrimina-
tion in order to accommodate national economic considerations,
such as cost equalization. Recognizing education's role in fostering
social integration and economic growth, the EC sets an example for
the United States. The United States also has a strong interest in
fostering social integration and economic growth and, like the EC,
it must promote such goals in the context of racial, religious, and
demographic heterogeneity. As universities are uniquely suited to
bridge such heterogeneity, they should play a central role in pro-
moting integration and growth.
Yet, education should also be used efficiently. Demands cre-
ated by a rapidly changing economy and burgeoning technological
development require greater diversity and specialization in fields
of study. Revising United States policies to eliminate barriers to
student mobility would not only enhance the ability of the educa-
tional system to meet such demands, but would do so without sac-
rificing efficiency concerns. Specifically, an "Academic Common
Market" would broaden access to educational opportunity, en-
hance diversity, promote efficiency, and improve quality-all with-
out necessarily enlarging public expenditure.
Thus, the United States would be wise to emulate the EC and
establish a national public university system. In so doing, United
States courts should declare tuition differentiation unconstitu-
tional, as such practices violate both the right to travel and the
Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause.
94 Id.
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